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Environmental Performance Auditing of
Government – the Role for an Australian
Commissioner for the Environment
GREGORY ROSE
Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Wollongong

Commonwealth performance in environmental management can be systematically assessed and reviewed
through public sector environmental audits. Australia’s experiences in public sector environmental audit
indicate that its difficulties lie in inadequate available baseline data and vague policy benchmarks.
Significant governmental efforts are being made to address the national data problem but not the
benchmarks. Recent trends towards more systematic government performance reporting may eventually
feed back to improve benchmarks. Some urge the establishment of an Australian Commissioner for the
Environment to implement performance reporting, amongst other tasks. The potential role of the
Commissioner as national auditor in particular is examined, drawing largely on Canadian experience.
There is so much governmental effort wasted in
penning placebo policies on the environment! Why
would anyone want to waste more effort in a further
paper chase, auditing follow up? Yet, given careful
attention, these wasting, dusty policy commitments
might have useful lives. Performance audits are
essential to ensure their vitality.
Current practice and possibilities for auditing
performance of environmental commitments by the
Commonwealth government in Australia are
explored in this article. Whether the task of public
environmental performance auditing should be
mandated to a new public office, such as a
Commissioner for the Environment, or to an
existing office, such as the Australian National
Audit Office, is considered. The object is to inform
aspects of the current debate concerning
establishment of a Commonwealth Commissioner
for the Environment.

the opportunities to increase efficiency gains
through improved internal management systems;
and the need for better public relations management
as corporate environmental performance came
under increasing public scrutiny. These trends
continue to promote the use of environmental audit
today and environmental audit is still primarily a
private sector activity.1
The International Standards Organisation defines
an environmental audit as
“a systematic, documented verification process
of objectively obtaining and evaluating evidence
to determine whether specific environmental
activities, events, conditions, management
systems, or information about these matters
conform with audit criteria, and communicating
the results of this process to the client”.2

Defining
audit

* The author thanks those who gave freely of their time and
knowledge in interviews for this article.
1
Gregory P Johnson, The ISO 14000 EMS Audit Handbook
(St Lucie Press, Boca Raton, USA 1997), p 2.
2
ISO 14010, s 3.9. The International Chamber of Commerce
definition of environmental auditing, which is widely accepted
by industry, addresses essentially private sector activity and is
less suited to public sector auditing is: a management tool
comprising a systematic, documented, periodic and objective
evaluation of how well environmental organisation, management
and equipment are performing with the aim of helping to
safeguard the environment by: facilitating management control of

environmental

performance

Environmental auditing emerged as a named
activity in the 1970s. It was widely taken up by
companies in the 1980s due to a number of factors:
the increasing requirements of, and penalties
associated with, governmental environmental
regulation; the need to manage civil liability risk;
June 2001
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This definition connotes different activities in
distinct circumstances. It covers, for example, a
one-off project assessment, such as management of
sediment dredging in a port development, or
ongoing systematic review of organisational
performance, for example of internal management
of energy efficiency.3 Thus, because the spectrum of
activities described as “environmental auditing” is
broad, the term is often used loosely. To avoid
confusion it is necessary to distinguish the
fragmented meanings of the term and to identify
exactly which environmental audit approaches and
methodologies are the appropriate subject of
consideration in public sector auditing of its own
environmental performance.

Legal compliance, due diligence and
performance audits distinguished
Common criteria for environmental audits in the
private sector are legal compliance and exercise of
due diligence. Compliance auditing determines
whether an organisation is operating in compliance
with all relevant legal obligations, usually set out in
legislation and regulations. Typically, compliance
audits identify specific problems of non-compliance
with environmental regulations. Additionally, an
audit may also be designed to ensure the exercise of
due diligence in fulfilling relevant legal obligations.
It then becomes a tool to assess the risk of noncompliance and to institute appropriate risk control
measures.4
A legal obligation is central to compliance and
due diligence audits. By contrast, a performance

environmental practices, and assessing compliance with company
policies, which includes meeting regulatory requirements. Ruth
Geldard, Environmental Auditing in Victoria: Private enterprise
and public sector examples (Monash University LLM thesis,
1995), p 1.
3
. The term has been used to cover a wide range of audit
procedures, including: Performance Audits (see below),
Environmental Management Systems Audits (see below),
Registration Audits (that is, for certification under a management
standard), Compliance Audits (see below), Site Audits (for
example, Examination for contamination, etcetera), Prediction
Audits (risks and trends), and Industry Audits (for example,
mining, timber sector performance).
4
Undertaking environmental audits to ensure exercise of due
diligence can also provide a defence to some environmental
offences, or be a mitigating factor in environmental prosecutions.
Allen Allen and Hemsley Due Diligence a Guide for Directors
(Australian Institute of Company Directors, Sydney, (no date)),
p 20.

audit is as broad as the objectives chosen by the
organisation . Thus, a performance audit may
examine, inter alia, whether the organisation is
acting in compliance with all relevant legislation
and how to manage the risk of non-compliance, as
subsidiary matters to assessment of organisational
environmental objectives. 5
Performance auditing is probably a more
appropriate and useful form of environmental audit
for public sector needs. Although it is now usual for
most arms of government to be bound to comply
with environmental laws in the same way as private
sector entities,6 it is not always the case that the
crown is bound and that a compliance audit is
appropriate.7 Further, the traditional responsibility
of government for natural resources management,
managed through policy setting, lends itself to
assessment of the performance.

The 4 “E”s of performance auditing
Public sector performance auditing aims to
determine whether an organisation is achieving its
objectives effectively, efficiently and economically.
These criteria are referred to as “The 3 ‘E’s” and
have been defined as follows:
• “Economy” is ‘the acquisition of the
appropriate quality and quantity of financial,
human and physical resources at the
appropriate times and at the lowest cost (that is,
spending less);
• “Efficiency” is making sure that the maximum
useful output is gained for any given set of
financial, human or physical resource inputs, or
is minimised for any given quantity and quality
of output provided (that is, spending well);
• “Effectiveness” is the achievement of the
objectives or other intended results of
programs, operations or activities (that is,
spending wisely).8

5

Neil Gunningham and James Prest, Environmental Audit as a
Regulatory Strategy: Prospects and Reform 15 Sydney Law
Review 492 [1993], 495.
6
For example, Commonwealth of Australia Environment
Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999, s 4.
7
For example, the Royal Australian Navy is not bound to
implement pollution control measures that are binding upon
Australian merchant ships.
8
Parliament of Victoria, Public Accounts and estimates
Committee Issues Paper No 3 Environmental Auditing and
Reporting (1998), p 31. The Australian National Audit Office
(ANAO) takes a slightly different approach, usually rolling
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A performance audit, per se, may concern any
organisational objective, such as growth in market
share. An environmental performance audit is a
simply a performance audit concerned with the
organisation’s environmental objectives. It is
premised upon the organisation identifying one or
more environmental objectives, which give rise to
“model” or “best practice” performance criteria. If
there are no policies, objectives and strategies it is
very difficult to do a performance audit because
there is nothing objective against which to assess
performance. It is important to note that
performance audits do not audit the appropriateness
or adequacy of government policy. They cover
merely the administration of existing policy.
A fourth “E”, advocated by some environmental
auditors, would be the regular, automatic inclusion
of
“environmental
sustainability”
in
all
organisational performance audits.9 It is premised
on the principle that all organisations should have
internalised some environmental objectives. Under
current performance audit practice, however,
environmental sustainability aspects are addressed
only when an audit is specifically commissioned to
examine them.

Auditing
performance
environmental
management
targets

against
system

Environmental management system (EMS)
audits assess performance against targets set out in
the EMS. Thus, EMS auditing is a sub-category of
performance auditing. The International Standards
Organisation (ISO) is negotiating a series of
international
standards
for
environmental
management – the ISO 14000 standards series.
These include an internationally accepted model for
an EMS, identified as ISO 14001, adopted in
1996.10 It requires that the organisation set itself

together the efficiency and economy criteria and often also
including an assurance element in many performance audit
reports. (See text at note 52 below.)
9
For example, Government of Canada Report of the
Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development
to the House of Commons 1997 (Ottawa 1997), p 16, para 55.
The 4th “E” has been formally introduced into the work of some
Auditors-General through legislative mandate. See Canada’s
1997 amendment to the Auditor-General Act 1997, introducing
s 7(2)(f), and the Australian Capital Territory’s 1997 amendment
to the Auditor-General’s Act, introducing s 12(2).
10
ISO, “ISO 14000 – Meet the Whole Family!” (ISO 1998)
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environmental goals, which are to be identified by
the organisation. Although it does not prescribe
goals, ISO 14001 does prescribe management
processes essential to the achievement of those
goals. They include undertaking an inventory and
assessment of environmental aspects of an
organisation’s operations, products and services;
that employees be trained and competent to handle
the environmental consequences of their work; and
that an organisation commit to processes of
continual environmental improvement.11
EMS Pyramid12
Continual Improvement
Management Review
Auditing and Corrective Action
Environmental Management Program
Environmental Objectives & Targets
Commitment & Environmental
Policy

The EMS standard rests at the foundation of the
structure of ISO 14000 standards that address,
amongst other things, environmental labelling, life
cycle assessment, certification and accreditation.13
ISO 14010 is the adopted standard for General
Principles on Environmental Auditing and its broad
scope14 can encompass audit of governmental
performance. The standard applies to all types of
environmental auditing, not just EMS auditing. The
audit criteria could be, for example, the
governmental policies, practices, procedures or
requirements against which the auditor compares
collected audit evidence. The criteria are set by the
“client”, which can be the governmental
organisation that calls for the audit. It appears well
adapted to public sector environmental performance
reporting.

available at ISO website http://www.iso.ch (accessed 21
September 2000).
11
Joseph Cascio, Woodside, Gayle and Mitchell, Philip ISO
14000 Guide – The New International Environmental
Management Standards (McGraw Hill, New York 1996), Ch 2.
For an organisation to register itself as having in place an EMS of
international standing, it needs to be certified and registered as
being in conformity with the requirements of ISO 14001.
12
Ibid, p 37.
13
ISO, op cit n 10.
14
See the definition used, op cit n 2.
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methodologies: state of environment
reporting and environmental impact
assessment

Public sector environmental audit
Governmental auditing needs to be seen in the
broader framework of tools for good public sector
governance. It promotes public sector accountability
to stakeholders for the proper performance of its
responsibilities, including the integrity, efficiency
and effectiveness of its performance. Stakeholders
whom the public sector serves include ministers,
parliament, the public and industry.
Within this broader accountability framework,
public sector environmental auditing assesses
proper performance of responsibilities for
environmental management. These management
responsibilities, across the whole of government,
can be conceived in three dimensions (see diagram):
• along a horizontal environmental policy axis,
including fundamental environmental policy
formulation (for example greenhouse gas
emissions
abatement
policy)
and
mainstreaming environmental responsibilities
into other social policy sectors (for example
mining, agriculture, tourism);
• along another horizontal axis concerning
internal
resources
management
within
departments, (for example, internal energy use
efficiency, green codes for goods procurement
and the use of waste processing systems);
• along a vertical axis which concerns the public
institution’s
environmental
management
systems (for example. consultation processes,
relevant quantified targets, trained personnel,
executive responsibility, feedback processes).
Public sector performance audits might address
proper performance of one or more of these
environmental management responsibilities. The
simple way to identify those responsibilities that can
be performance audited is to identify the
performance commitments made by government
itself. These include obligations under legislation,
commitments for whole-of-government approaches
articulated in published policy, and departmental or
agency commitments set out in publicly accessible
documents.15

Contrasting

15

environmental

review

See inventory of selected Commonwealth policies in
Appendix III and the discussion of the National Strategy for
Ecologically Sustainable Development, op cit n 67 below.

Other methodologies for assessing public sector
environmental performance are sometimes confused
with that for public sector environmental
performance audit. They are forms of environmental
review but not performance audits. State of
Environment (SOE) reporting, for example, is a
form of public sector environmental review but it is
not a performance audit. The Commonwealth Land
and Water Resources Research and Development
Commission (LWRRDC) is engaged in a process of
reporting on the state of national soil, vegetation
and water resources which it describes as a National
Land and Water Resources Audit but it is not a
performance audit.16
Given that environmental management has
traditionally been a public sector environmental
function, SOE reporting does in fact reflect
indirectly on the effectiveness of consecutive
governments’ performance over time. However,
SOE reporting focuses on scientific assessment, not
performance assessment. Actual changes in
environmental conditions may be caused by actions
beyond the control of an incumbent government.
Indeed, performance against public sector
commitments, per se, is not directly or specifically
assessed through SOE reporting. While the
information in an SOER is essential to describe
baselines and movement in environmental quality
indicators, as well as to describe sources and
dynamics of environmental change, it does not in
itself assess the economy, efficiency and
effectiveness, of performance of identified public

16

The Land and Water Resources Audit is managed by the
Land and Water Resources Research and Development
Corporation over a four year program due to conclude in June
2001 and is funded by the Natural Heritage Trust with a budget
of A$30 million. It is intended to provide an objective national
assessment of the extent of natural resource degradation to
establish baselines for trends analysis, creating integrated
nationally compatible data sets and links with the State of the
Environment reporting process, indicators for sustainable
development, etc. It is seeking to stitch together the various
databases held by Commonwealth and State agencies to create a
coherent whole. See http://www.nlwra.gov.au (accessed 6
October 2000).

Diagram – Public sector environmental audit: whole of government management responsibilities
sector environmental commitments.17
The usual methodology for analysis used for
SOE reporting is the Pressure-State-Response
model.18 This simply describes the state of the
environment based on environmental quality
indicators, in the context of pressures from human
activities and responses by governments, enterprises
and households. SOE reporting gives broad pictures
of the environmental status quo in a continual
process, necessary to formulate environmental
commitments and to review them but, unlike
environmental auditing, it is not premised on a
commitments implementation process.
An Environmental Impact Statement is another
product of a public environmental assessment
process that can be associated with, but does not

17

The 1998 SOE report produced by the Western Australian
government is unusual for its emphasis on identifying future
environmental action. Although it is not a performance audit, it is
explicitly linked to review of environmental policy and
governmental response actions. See “State of the Environment”
www.environ.wa.gov.au/DEP/soe (accessed 26 October 2000).
18
Australia: State of the Environment 1996 (CSIRO,
Melbourne 1996), pp 1-6.
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equate to, an audit. The Statement, produced
through the environmental impact assessment (EIA)
process, is required under law to be produced by an
organisation as a prerequisite to its gaining project
development approval or other permits.19 However,
in relation to timing, EIA stands at the other end of
the time continuum from environmental auditing.
EIA is carried out before a new project is
developed, to predict the future impact of the
proposed action,20 whereas environmental auditing
examines the actual environmental impact of those
operations.21 Nevertheless, where an EIA results in
conditions being set in a development approval,
regular auditing can be used as a form of monitoring

19
For example, Environment and Protection Biodiversity
Conservation Act 1999, s 66.
20
UNEP EIA Training Resource Manual; Monitoring,
Implementing and Auditing (UNEP, 1997), pp 1-2, 5-6. Available
at http://www.environment.gov.au/portfolio/epg/eianet/manual/
manuaI /topi c11.htm.
21
Further, only two thirds of national auditing authorities
around the world do not have a mandate to perform EIA. See
INTOSAI Working Group on Environmental Auditing “Results
of 1993 Survey” at http://www.rekenkamer.nl/ea (accessed 21
September 2000).
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to see what impacts do occur; to ensure that the
anticipated impacts are maintained within the levels
predicted; and to ensure that conditions of approval
are adhered to.22
Standards for public sector environmental audit
In contrast with the standard methodologies for
SOE reporting and EIA, or for annual public sector
financial statements and audits,23 the methodology
for public sector environmental statements and
audits is not well established. Performance audits, in
general, examine and assess resource use,
information systems, delivery of outputs and
outcomes including performance indicators,
monitoring systems and legal and ethical
compliance, in order to determine if an organisation
is performing efficiently, economically and
effectively.24 However, these procedures are not
refined for the specific purposes of public sector
environmental performance audits.
For example, there is as yet no accepted
international requirement that environmental
performance audits, in either the public or private
sector, include recommendations or follow up. A no
frills audit might not include that task within the
terms of reference and a performance auditor will
not identify risks flowing from a failure to meet
objectives, investigate their causes or describe
remedies for failure, unless instructed to do so. Yet
one might think that a public sector environmental
performance audit ought always to do so.
A further example is the lack of internationally
accepted guidelines as to disclosure of public or
private sector environmental audits. In the private
sector, environmental audits are usually conducted
only on a voluntary basis, are not reviewed by any
government authority, may be subject to legal
professional privilege, and are not usually disclosed
for public scrutiny except in rare cases involving
statutory or mandatory audits.25 Accordingly, ISO

22

Indeed, the performance of EIA as an environmental
management tool can be also audited to assess its effectiveness.
See: Ralph C Buckley, Precision in Environmental Impact
Prediction: First National Environmental Audit, Australia
(CRES/ANU Press, Canberra 1989).
23
The content of financial statements setting out internal
corporate financial management by Commonwealth entities is far
more clearly specified. (See: Financial Management and
Accountability Act 1997, s 55.)
24
See generally, Johnson, op cit n 1, p 2.
25
The audit has no force in law and is admissible in court only

14010 standards do not require any communication
of results to the public or to anyone other than the
client.26 On good governance and public
accountability grounds, however, audits carried out
by public sector institutions should not confidential.
Thus, under the Commonwealth Auditor-General
Act 1997, public sector performance audits are made
public. Similarly, EIA and SOE reporting processes
are carried out for public benefit and are always
open to public scrutiny.

Australian experience in public sector
environmental performance audit
The diverse and complex roles of government
and relatively long periods between elections
prevent timely, specific and effective market
feedback to government on its environmental
performance. Therefore, it must generate its own
feedback.27
Thus,
governments
can
use
environmental audits to test and improve their own
environmental
management,
to
design
environmental policy and to respond to public
concerns over specific environmental management
issues.28
Along the first horizontal axis of Commonwealth
environmental management commitments there is a
need for auditing against the performance criteria
set in an increasing number of environmental
policy, legislation and treaty commitments. National
policies proliferated during the 1990s29 and their
implementation is not widely or routinely subject to
review.30 Many national commitments have been
made at the international level through treaties and
international action plans.31 Along the same axis,

as evidence of “all due diligence” on the basis of voluntary
disclosure by the defendant. See EPA Environmental Audit; Best
Practice Environmental Management in Mining, (Cth of Aust.,
Canberra, 1996), p 8.
26
Johnson, op cit n, p 254.
27
Productivity Commission Report No 5 Implementation of
Ecologically
Sustainable
Development
Principles
by
Commonwealth Departments and Agencies (Cth of Aust 1999),
p 53.
28
AIDAB Handbook for Environmental Audit Sector Report
No 1 (1991), p 7.
29
See Appendix III.
30
Productivity Commission Report No 5, op cit n 27, p 57 and
Table 4.2.
31
Donald R Rothwell, “From the Franklin to Berlin: The
Internationalisation of Australian Environmental Law and
Policy” 17 Sydney Law Review 242. Although some treaty and
action plan commitments incorporate international mechanisms
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further obligations are contained in some
Commonwealth legislation that binds the Crown.32
Systematic review of implementation of these
commitments at the national level is necessary to
assess the effectiveness of any actions taken as well
as for good domestic governance.
Along the second horizontal axis lie
environmental impacts of governments’ own
internal resource use, such as paper, water and
energy consumption, and waste output. These are of
substantial consequence as government purchasing
power and operations are a major influence upon the
economy.33 There is a need for appropriate policies
to be formulated and implemented to address
governmental operations. One example of this is the
Commonwealth’s 1997 Energy Policy.34
But are there management systems in place to
ensure proper formulation and implementation of
such policies? Such audits take place only
sporadically. Along the vertical axis of
environmental management systems, Australia was
externally assessed in 1997 by the international
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD). As part of the cycle of
national environmental performance reviews
conducted of its members, the OECD report
evaluated
the
general
implementation of
environmental policies.35 Findings included
“significant potential” for improving effectiveness
and efficiency. Most relevant for this article were
the particular identification of inadequate coverage

for implementation review, they are for the most part
insubstantial, imposing little assessment at the national level.
(See G Rose, “Non-Compliance in International Environmental
Law” conference paper delivered at “Visits under International
Law: Verification, Monitoring and Prevention” (23 and 24
September 1999, Geneva, Switzerland) on file with author.
32
For example, Environment Protection Biodiversity
Conservation Act 1999, s 4.
33
In the 1997-1998 financial year, Australian Commonwealth
revenue was almost $136 billion and outlays $141 billion, or 25
per cent of GDP. See Australia Now - A Statistical Profile http://www.abs.gov.au/Ausstats
Government
Finance
at
(accessed 25 September 2000).
34
Performance under this policy, which requires government
agencies to meet energy efficiency targets, was audited in 1999.
See ANAO Energy Efficiency in Commonwealth Operations,
Report No 47 1998-99 (Department of Industry, Science and
Resources, and Australian Greenhouse Office) Table 4.
35
OECD Environmental Performance Reviews: Australia
(OECD Paris 1998). The report also examined integration of
economic and environmental concerns and international
cooperation in environment protection.
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and consistency in environmental monitoring and
data, which weakens Australia’s ability to track
environmental progress, to formulate cost-effective
policies and to measure performance.36 The OECD
recommended upgrading national efforts for
collection and assessment of environmental data.
Further, it found that the setting of quantifiable
targets and timetables would be useful in this
context, as well as the creation of appropriate
institutional mechanisms, Federal cooperative
mechanisms, peer reviews of the environmental
performance of States and Territories and
accelerated greening of government operations.37

Commonwealth environmental reporting
obligations
The following discussion examines in more
detail the extent to which internal institutional
management systems along the vertical axis are now
in place to ensure that Commonwealth
environmental commitments are performed
economically, efficiently and effectively.
The Commonwealth Environment Protection and
Biodiversity Conservation Act 199938 (EPBC Act)
came into force, for most parts, on 16 July 2000.
Section 516A of the Act was inserted at a late stage
into the Bill while it was under consideration in the
Parliament, as indicated by both the numbering and
the awkward text.39 It addresses the obligations of
Commonwealth governmental bodies to deal with
environmental matters in their annual reports. The
new obligations apply to annual reports for the year
ending 30 June 2001.40 The obligations apply to
public
service
departments,
Parliamentary
departments, Commonwealth authorities and
companies and to agencies established under

36

Ibid, p 19.
Ibid, p 28.
Act No 91, 1999.
39
Commonwealth parliamentary opposition views advocating
that environmental auditing and State of Environment reporting
should be included within the Act are set out in Appendix II. The
government opposed both. It seems likely that s 516A on
environmental auditing was inserted as part of a late deal with
opposition parties to ensure passage of the Bill through the
Senate. Requirements for State of Environment reporting are now
also set out in the Act, at s 516B.
40
Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet “Requirements for
Annual Reports”, s 14(1), at http://www.pmc.govt_index.html
(accessed 27 September 2000)
37
38
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Commonwealth law.41 The environmental content
requirements for the annual reports are not clear.
Section 516A(6) provides that annual reports must:
(a) include a report on how the actions of,
and the administration (if any) of [any
Commonwealth] legislation by, the
reporter during the period accorded with
the principles of ecologically sustainable
development; and
(b) identify how the outcomes (if any)
specified for the reporter in an
Appropriations Act relating to the period
contribute to ecologically sustainable
development; and
(c) document the effect of the reporter’s
actions on the environment; and
(d) identify any measures the reporter is
taking to minimise the impact of actions
by the reporter on the environment; and
(e) identify the mechanisms (if any) for
reviewing
and
increasing
the
effectiveness of those measures.
These environmental content requirements can
be considered as addressing the effects, both
positive (paras (a) and (b)) and negative (paras (c),
(d) and (e)) that the Commonwealth institution has
on the environment. They can be interpreted as
including commitments made under national and
international environmental instruments.
An action referred to under para 516A(6)(a) is
defined in the legislation as including a project,
development, undertaking or activity42 but excludes

41

(1) The Secretary of a Department under the Public Service
Act 1999 must ensure that a report under s 25 of that Act
complies with subs (6). (2) The relevant Presiding Officer in
relation to a Parliamentary Department (as defined in s 9B of the
Public Service Act 1922) must ensure that a report under that
section complies with subs (6). (3) The directors of a
Commonwealth authority (as defined in the Commonwealth
Authorities and Companies Act 1997) must ensure that an annual
report relating to the authority prepared under that Act complies
with subs (6). (4) A Commonwealth company (as defined in the
Commonwealth Authorities and Companies Act 1997) that is a
Commonwealth agency must ensure that the documents given to
the responsible Minister (as defined in that Act) under s 36 of
that Act include a report complying with subs (6). (5)A
Commonwealth agency that is:
(a) established by or under a law of the Commonwealth; and
(b) required by law to give the Minister responsible for it an
annual report; and
(c) not described in subsection (3) or (4);
must ensure that the annual report complies with subs (6).
42
EPBC Act, s 523.

the making of governmental decisions.43 The
“principles
of
ecologically
sustainable
development” (ESD), referred to under paragraph
516A(6)(a), are defined in the EPBC Act’s general
list of definitions as having “a meaning affected by
section 3A”.44 Section 3A provides:
The following principles are principles of
ecologically sustainable development:
(a) decision-making
processes
should
effectively integrate both long-term and
short-term economic, environmental,
social and equitable considerations;
(b) if there are threats of serious or
irreversible environmental damage, lack
of full scientific certainty should not be
used as a reason for postponing measures
to prevent environmental degradation;
(c) the principle of inter-generational
equity—that the present generation
should ensure that the health, diversity
and productivity of the environment is
maintained or enhanced for the benefit of
future generations;
(d) the conservation of biological diversity
and ecological integrity should be a
fundamental consideration in decisionmaking;
(e) improved valuation, pricing and incentive
mechanisms should be promoted.
It is difficult to imagine how any Commonwealth
body’s accordance with the ESD principles set out
above might be demonstrated in the environmental
sections of its annual reports. No quantified criteria
or governance processes are prescribed. The
principles are broad and general and render practical
implementation of the reporting task either vastly
unmanageable, or trivial and superficial. The ESD
principles referred to in s 516A(6)(a) are not
exhaustively defined in Art 3A.45 Article 528
provides simply that the principles have a meaning
“affected by Article 3A”, leaving open the
possibility that the principles referred to in s

43

EPBC Act, s 524. Amendments to s 516A included in the
Environmental Legislation Amendment Bill will broaden its
scope beyond the limits of ss 523 and 524.
44
EPBC Act, s 528.
45
While the language used in Art 3A is arguably exclusive
(expressio unius), it is not surely so as the Article refers generally
to “principles” rather than using the definitive article for “the
principles”.
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516(6)(a) can be elaborated and specified through
the use of guidelines, subsidiary legislation, or
interpretation.
Under Art 516A(6)(b), the outcomes specified for
a budget allocated to a Commonwealth body under
an Appropriations Act during the financial year
reported on must be described in terms of the
outcomes’ positive contribution to ESD. This
provision on outcomes suffers also from the lack of
specificity in criteria or processes inherent in the
definition
of
sustainable
development.
Commonwealth bodies will be in need of guidelines
for their reporting under this provision. The
Department of Finance and Administration seems
the appropriate body to develop benchmarks for
reporting guidelines,46 in cooperation with the
Department of Environment and Heritage.
Paragraph (c) seems to require an inventory of
retrospective environmental impacts, while para (d)
seeks information as to measures currently in place
to address those impacts. The relationship between
paras (c) and (d) is ambiguous. All impacts should
be described, irrespective of measures to minimise
them, so that a comprehensive account can be
obtained of the impacts and costs of addressing the
impacts. On the other hand, it could be asserted that
the inventory of effects described under (c) (for
example, contamination of land) might need to
cover only those effects not ameliorated under para
(d) (for example, because a clean up has been
conducted). The former interpretation is preferable
to ensure transparency. Guidelines need to be
prepared to clarify this point and to set out a
checklist of impacts (for example, waste output
streams, identified resources inputs or uses) and of
ameliorative measures (for example, procurement
codes, efficiency measures) to be described. In
addition, comparable methodologies and units for
their measurement (that is, core indicators) need to
be defined.
While most content requirements of s 516A(6)
concern description of past actions taken, para (e)
uniquely addresses future actions. It requires that
annual reports identify mechanisms to review and
increase the effectiveness of measures to minimise
environmental impacts. This is in effect a
requirement for Commonwealth bodies to develop
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As is the case in Canada, see text below accompanying
footnote 125.
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processes of continuous environmental performance
improvement, which is an important element of any
standard environmental management system. Thus,
s 516A(6)(e) obliquely introduces the requirement to
develop an EMS.
At the foot of EPBC Act s 516A(6) is the
following cryptic note:
“Note: The Auditor-General Act 1997 lets the
Auditor-General audit a reporter’s compliance
with these requirements.”
In contrast to the discretion to audit
environmental
statements
under
s
516A,
Commonwealth institution financial statements are
subject to compulsory audit under the Financial
Management and Accountability Act 1997.47 The
audited financial statements together with the
Auditor-General’s assurance report thereon, are
required to be included in the Annual Report of
each governmental body.48 There is novel
opportunity here for the Auditor-General to
introduce a comparable system for annual audits of
environmental performance statements, assisted for
the first time by the data required to be provided by
Commonwealth bodies.
Despite the vagaries of s 516A, it is an enormous
step forward for environmental performance
auditing in the Australian public sector. Currently,
detailed criteria and processes for environmental
reporting in the form of guidelines are being
developed by Environment Australia.49 No doubt,
these will need to be refined through experience in
their application.

Functions of the Australian National Audit
Office
The role of the Australian National Audit Office
(ANAO), as established under the Auditor-General
Act 1997 (Commonwealth), is to assist the AuditorGeneral in providing independent audit of public
sector entities, including Commonwealth agencies,
authorities and companies.50 ANAO fulfils this role
by undertaking programs of audits of performance

47

Financial Management and Accountability Act, s 56.
Ibid, p 57. The audited financial statements must be prepared
in accordance with the prescribed Finance Minister’s Orders.
49
Personal interview, Andrew Major, Assistant Director,
Intergovernmental Unit, International and Intergovernmental
Branch, Environment Australia, 21 September 2000.
50
Auditor-General Act 1997, ss 11, 12, 13.
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and of financial statements.51 Chief executives are
obliged to manage the affairs of their agencies in a
way that promotes proper use of Commonwealth
resources, where proper use means efficient,
effective and ethical use.52 The Auditor-General has
the mandate to undertake performance audits at his
or her unfettered discretion53 in relation to
Commonwealth bodies.54 Audits of environmental
management are obviously within the mandate.55
Across the decade 1990-1999, 24 audits of
environmental
relevance
were
conducted,56
averaging approximately two or three each year. For
example, of the 26 performance audit reports tabled
by ANAO in the first half of 1999, one related to
internal corporate environmental management by
Commonwealth entities.57 These audits comprise
approximately four per cent of ANAO audits
produced, about equal to the average rate for
environmental audits among performance audits
conducted by national audit institutions globally.58
Strategic planning for performance audits in
2000-2001 is guided by six broad themes,
considered by it to be important to the Parliament

51

ANAO has two Services Groups: the Performance Audit
Services Group and the Assurance Audit Services Group.
General performance audits are mandated under Art 18 of the
Auditor General Act 1997. See “Delivering an Integrated Audit
Service” http://www.anao.gov.au/Auditstr.html (accessed 10
August 1999).
52
Financial Management and Accountability Act, s 44. The
ANAO includes an ethical performance assessment component in
all audits, although the identification of particular ethical criteria
is difficult and can only be meaningfully related to conformity
with the purpose of spending mandates.
53
Auditor General Act 1997, s 8.
54
Other than Government Business Enterprises (GBEs) or
persons employed under the Members of Parliament (Staff) Act
1984. For wholly owned GBEs, performance audits may be
undertaken by the Auditor-General where requested by the
Minister, the Finance Minister or the Joint Committee of Public
Accounts and Audit. This article does not examine whether these
provisions of the Auditor General Act restrict the ANAO from
undertaking environmental performance audits of Parliamentary
Departments or Commonwealth Companies required to produce
environmental reports under EPBC s 516A(2) and (4).
55
The meaning of the “environment” is not limited in its normal
meaning or in Commonwealth legislation to areas of national
jurisdiction and, interestingly, the Auditor General’s mandate
covers examination of acts outside Australia (Auditor-General
Act 1997, s 4).
56
See Appendix 1.
57
See Appendix I.
58
INTOSAI Working Group on Environmental Auditing
“Results of 1993 Survey” at http://www.rekenkamer.nl/ea
(accessed 21 September 2000).

and the wider Australian community. These do not
explicitly address environmental performance.59 The
ANAO does not as yet have a dedicated program of
environmental performance auditing but addresses
itself to environmental agencies or programs as the
perceived need arises.60 Thus, subjects for audits are
selected on the basis of a systematic assessment of
the risks to the government program and the
benefits an audit can provide.61
As at the time of writing, ANAO is organised
into two divisions, one for financial auditing and the
other for performance auditing. There are
approximately 100 staff members in the
performance auditing division, within which eight
branches are responsible for sectoral portfolios. A
branch of 12 officers addresses a group of portfolios
that includes an environment and heritage section of
two to three officers.62 Although most
environmental performance audits would focus on
the environment and heritage portfolios, some
environmental audits are addressed by personnel
assigned to other portfolios, either as a specific
issue or as one of a number of other issues. This
level of resources would fall just below the middle
of the one per cent to 10 per cent range of resources
committed to environment related auditing by
national audit institutions around the world.63
Appendix I indicates the various portfolios
addressed in environment related audits.
Of course, the performance objectives in
environmental policies and programs assessed are
not confined to environmental ones. However,
examination of the reports produced shows that the
main focus of the environment audits tends to be on
economy and efficiency, rather than effectiveness in

59

The six themes are: Governance – Human Resource
Management; Governance – Financial Management; Governance
– Performance Information; Procurement and Contract
Management; Information Technology; and Service Delivery.
(Delivering
an
Integrated
Audit
Service
http://www.anao.gov.au/Auditstr.html)
60
Personal interview, Mr Michael Lewis, Executive Director,
Performance Audit Services, 22 June 2000.
61
In considering the risks and benefits, the ANAO examines the
financial materiality, the significance of the program, the
visibility of the program, as reflected in its political sensitivity or
national importance, and the lack of recent audit coverage and
internal or external review.
62
Ibid.
63
INTOSAI Working Group on Environmental Auditing
“Results of 1993 Survey” at http://www.rekenkamer.nl/ea
(accessed 21 September 2000).
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meeting environmental objectives.64 The reasons are
essentially technical. Data for assessing economy
and efficiency are more readily available and
standard methodologies are clearly defined. In
contrast, assessment of the effectiveness of
environmental performance is hindered by
methodological obstacles and data paucity. Often,
environmental objectives are articulated in vague
terms, obscuring criteria for assessment, and
baseline data and ecological cause-effect
relationships are unknown, making effectiveness
difficult to measure.65 For example, in its report on
Commonwealth Natural Resource Management and
Environment Programs, the ANAO concluded that,
although the government agencies concerned were
constrained by poor baseline information and long
lead times in achieving outcomes, their program
objectives were too broad and unspecific to identify
outcomes, their administration lacked committed
focus on outcomes, and performance information
collection was inadequate.66
All indications are that some new, external
impetus would be necessary for a more systematic
and pervasive ANAO approach to environmental
performance auditing. It remains to be seen whether
EPBC Art 516A together with governmental
commitment and public pressure might generate a
focus on systematic auditing of Commonwealth
environmental performance.

Productivity Commission review
The
Productivity
Commission
is
the
Commonwealth Government’s principal review and
advisory body on micro-economic policy.67 Under
the Productivity Commission Act 1998, the
Commission’s
functions
include
holding

independent public inquiries and reporting on
matters relating to industry and productivity.68 The
Productivity
Commission’s
general
policy
guidelines require the Commission to ensure that
industry develops in a way that is ecologically
sustainable.69 Productivity can be interpreted to
include optimal productivity of natural resources
and the Productivity Commission has explicitly
stated that “sound economic management requires
sound
environmental
management”.70
The
Commission therefore considers environmental and
social aspects in all its activities and has produced
several reports on environmental issues.
Most relevant to the environmental performance
auditing of government is the Commission’s report
on Implementation of Ecologically Sustainable
Development by Commonwealth Departments and
Agencies.71 This was the first national
environmental performance assessment conducted
after the 1997 OECD72 report and it is the most
comprehensive of Commonwealth performance
evaluations. It focuses on how department and
agencies implement ESD principles and “how they
monitor, evaluate and report on implementation of
ESD”. Less diplomatic and more specific than the
OECD report, it produced a survey of selected
departments’ and agencies’ approaches to
incorporating ESD principles into decisionmaking.73 The report found that it is uncommon for
ESD principles to be fully taken into account from
the initial policy development stages right through
to the monitoring and review of the policies and
programs.74 It found that there were no legislated
requirements for ESD monitoring, other than in
relation to airports, although limited governmental
ESD monitoring requirements are set out in some
ESD policy instruments. A survey of actual
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See for example the reports on energy management and
airport noise, Appendix I.
65
INTOSAI Working Group on Environmental Auditing
“Results of 1993 Survey” at http://www.rekenkamer.nl/ea
(accessed 21 September 2000).
66
Audit Report No 36 1996-97. A mid-term review on the
management of the $A1.5 billion Natural Heritage Trust drew
similar conclusions. It was commissioned by the government
from a variety of public and private sources and is comprised of
28 separate reports and released in February 2000, see:
www.nht.gov.au.
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Three bodies merged to form the Productivity Commission in
1998. These were the Industry Commission, the Bureau of
Industry Economics and the Economic Planning Advisory
Commission. (See Productivity Commission Home page
www.pc.gov.au (accessed 21 September 2000).)
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Under s 6, these cover, inter alia, legislation or administrative
action taken, or to be taken, by the Commonwealth, a State or
Territory that affects or might affect the productivity
performance of industry, industry development or the
productivity performance of the economy as a whole.
69
Productivity Commission Act, Pt 2, s 8.
70
Productivity Commissioner Neil Byron and Barbara
Arentino, “Sound economic management requires sound
environmental management”, conference paper at National
Environmental Law Association 18th Annual Conference (NELA,
Canberra, 1999).
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Productivity Commission Inquiry Report No 5 25 May 1999.
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Op cit n 35.
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Ibid, Table 4.1.
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Ibid, p 63.
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monitoring and review of implementation75 found
that these activities are not widely undertaken
routinely and there are few examples where the
results of monitoring are fed back into the policy or
program.76
The report made recommendations to improve
frameworks and processes for monitoring and
review, particularly over the longer term.77 These
included departments and agencies regularly
monitoring the efficiency and effectiveness of their
ESD related policies, programs and regulations;78
and the Australian Bureau of Statistics developing
standard classifications and measurement protocols
for collection of state of the environment data and
sustainability indicators.79 It is significant that a
jettisoned Draft Recommendation 7.5, suggesting
that Commonwealth, State and Territory
governments cooperate to facilitate performance
measurement and comparisons of the effectiveness
and efficiency of ESD programs, was deleted from
the Final Report, no doubt because of the difficult
political sensitivities associated with coordinating
such action. Similarly, the Report canvassed
adoption of new performance assessment
mechanisms, and noted the relevance of a
Commissioner for ESD in this respect, but failed to
make any specific recommendations.80 The Report
merely concluded that leadership is needed at the
highest level and that the Prime Minister’s Science,
Engineering and Innovation Council, which is
chaired by the Prime Minister and includes key
Cabinet Ministers, could consider reporting on a
triennial basis “on matters relating to further
implementation of ESD with a longer term strategic
focus”.81
This rather lame conclusion to an excellent study
suggests apprehension of the political and
institutional constraints that would confront

Australia’s
Agency
for
International
Development (AusAID) audits the field impacts of
its development activities. It does not audit impacts
of its corporate operations. AusAID incorporates
into its operations explicit sustainable development
objectives, which require:
“the integration of economic, environmental and
social considerations into the delivery of the
development cooperation program ...
(i) to enhance potential environmental
benefits;
(ii) to mitigate adverse effects; and
(iii) to highlight projects where objectives may
be seriously undermined by unsatisfactory
environmental factors”.82
The two mechanisms for achieving these
objectives are environmental assessment83 and
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Ibid, Table 4.2.
Ibid, p 65.
77
Ibid, Overview xvii.
78
Ibid, Recommendation 7.4. It went on to require the
development of performance indicators against clearly stated
objectives established early in the policy development phase,
using the framework of the National Land and Water Resources
Audit in areas such as air quality, fisheries, chemicals and marine
systems.
79
Ibid, Recommendation 7.5.
80
Ibid, Ch 8.
81
Ibid, Recommendation 9.1. The draft report had dared no
recommendation at all on this matter.
76

proposals for improved accountability. The
Commonwealth government usually makes a
response to its Productivity Commission reports but,
at the time of writing this article 18 months later, is
yet to do so for that report. Nevertheless, the report
provides a useful block for building institutions for
better environmental performance accountability
and EPBC Act s 516A might be seen as a partial
response.

Internal agency audits
For this article, a survey of annual reports of
Commonwealth departments and agencies engaged
in activities with major sustainable development
impacts was undertaken. It found that currently only
two Commonwealth agencies systematically audit
their performance in the context of environmental
policy implementation and that no agencies report
an overall environmental performance assessment.
Australian Agency for International Development

Australian Agency for International Development
Environmental Assessment Guidelines for Australia's Aid
Program, (AusAID, Canberra, 1996), p 5.
83
Under EPBC Act s 160, the AusAID is required to refer
actions that might entail significant environmental impacts to the
Environment Minister for advice. Under s 164, actions are then
assessed through the EIA process . Under the superseded
Environment (Impact of Proposals) Act 1974 (Commonwealth) a
Record of Understanding with Environment Australia allowed,
procedures operative under the Act to be applied flexibly, in
deference to the laws of countries where the impacts are to take
place. (AusAID Environmental Assessment Guidelines for
Australia’s Aid Program (Canberra 1996), p7).
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environmental audit procedures.
In 1990 the federal government committed to an
annual environmental audit and developed
guidelines for environmental audit of its
international development cooperation activities.84 It
also adopted its “Ecologically Sustainable
Development in International Development
Cooperation: An Interim Policy Statement” in
response to the Senate Committee on Environment,
Recreation and the Arts report on “Environmental
Impact of Development Assistance”.85
Between 1991 and 1994, AusAID (then
AIDAB)86 commissioned annual environment
audits.87 All four audits involved consultants
examining project documentation (that is, desk
audits) to assess project environmental impacts and
commenting
on
AusAID’s
environmental
assessment procedures. The 1994 audit included a
field assessment of project impacts.
Following the 1994 audit, the frequency of
environmental audits was reduced to one every
three years, with environmental cluster evaluations
of projects in each of the intervening years.88
Cluster evaluations involve a field assessment of
impacts for a group of projects in a related sector,
whereas the focus of an environmental audit is now
a desk examination of environmental assessment
and management systems. An environmental audit
was conducted in 1999 (yet to be published) that
reviewed the effectiveness of AusAID’s 1996
“Environmental
Assessment Guidelines for
Australia’s Aid Program”.89
It is evident that the content and form of
AusAID’s internal environmental audit program is
constantly changing. It evolved through the 1990s to
better suit the organisation’s needs. Field audits of
international operations are expensive and the main
reason for scaling back seems to be resource
limitation. While efforts to audit operations were

strong in the early 1990s, they may be faltering 10
years later.
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Australian International Development Assistance Bureau
(AIDAB) Sector Report No1 A Handbook for Environmental
Audit (Canberra, 1991).
85
Ibid.
86
Australian International Development Assistance Bureau.
87
AusAID 1994 Environment Audit of the Australian Overseas
Aid Program (Canberra 1994), p 5.
88
In accordance with AusAID’s acceptance of the 1994 report
at recommendation 14.
89
Personal interview, Tim Eldridge, Environmental Analyst,
Rural Infrastructure and Environment, AusAID, 21 September
2000.
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Australian Fisheries Management Authority
The Australian Fisheries Management Authority
(AFMA) has statutory obligations90 to ensure that
the exploitation of fisheries resources and any
related activities are conducted in a manner
consistent with the principles of ESD, with
particular regard to the impact of fishing activities
on non-target species and the marine environment.
In its 1996 report on Commonwealth Fisheries
Management, the ANAO severely criticised AFMA
for failing to take appropriate steps to meet its
statutory objectives.91 In relation to fisheries
sustainability, the audit found that a lack of output
based performance indicators (such as stock
assessments) shielded the organisation from public
accountability and that, in relation to environmental
performance, its annual reports did ‘not provide an
indication of its success in limiting fishing to
ecologically sustainable levels’.92 Following the
ANAO report, the Commonwealth Parliament
commenced an inquiry into AFMA in 1996 and then
tabled a report in 1997.93 The report was more
sympathetic to AFMA than the ANAO and noted
that AFMA was putting in place improved
performance management measures.
In fact, AFMA agreed with most of the ESD and
performance
accountability
related
recommendations in the ANAO report.94 It now
includes an Environment Report and also reports
against performance indicators in each of its Annual
Reports, addressing its ESD obligations.95 These
developments suggest that official audit and
Parliamentary review procedures do promote
tangible improvements in governmental agencies
systems for management of their environmental
performance.

Fisheries Management Act 1991, s 3.
Report No 32 1995-1996, Vol 1.
92
Ibid, p 26-27.
93
Commonwealth of Australia Managing Commonwealth
Fisheries: The Last Frontier Standing Committee on Primary
Industries Resources and Rural and Regional Affairs Report
(Canberra 1997).
94
Ibid, p 32, 36.
95
For further follow up see David Nicholls and Tom Young
‘Australian Fisheries Management and ESD - The One that Got
Away?’ 17/4 Environmental Planning and Law Journal 272
(2000).
91
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Agriculture Fisheries and Forests Australia and
Environment Australia
Two other agencies which annually report on
their environmental performance and have major
sustainable development impacts are Agriculture
Fisheries and Forests Australia (AFFA) and
Environment Australia (EA). AFFA reports
regularly against sustainability objectives for natural
resources management, that it publishes in its
annual report. However, the objectives lack specific
performance criteria and the corresponding items
are superficially reported.96 Environment Australia
similarly reports annually against highly generalised
objectives by providing descriptions of its activities
but without evaluation against specific criteria.97 In
neither case do the agency reports qualify as
performance audits. It seems likely that assessments
of their actual environmental performance could not
be meaningfully performed against the objectives
adopted. It is certain that, for these reasons at least,
neither agency would bear up well under an external
audit of their respective environmental performance
management systems. Due to the central role of
these agencies in formulation and implementation of
Commonwealth
environmental
management
policies, improvement in their management systems
should be considered a priority.
National Environment Protection Council
Important to mention in the context of internal
reviews for the effectiveness of environmental
performance is the National Environment Protection
Council (NEPC). NEPC produces an annual report,
the first and only so far being for the year 19981999. The report reviews the effectiveness of
National Environment Protection Measures
(NEPMs). Reviews of effectiveness are selfexecuted by the governments of the participating
jurisdictions (ie. all nine Australian governments)
and are drawn together by the NEPC service
corporation. Although they are not environmental
performance audits based upon a standard
performance cycle or environmental management
system, the reviews do report against specific
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See 1998-1999 report, annual reports for AFFA are available
at http://www.affa.gov.au
97
See 1998-1999 report, annual reports for Environment
Australia are available at http://www.ea.gov.au

annual performance targets.98 The reviews are
significant for indicating a trend towards reporting
effectiveness of national environmental policies. 99

Australian States and Territories
Australian Capital Territory
New steps are being taken to audit government
environmental performance at the Australian State
and Territory levels. The Commissioner for the
Environment created in the Australian Capital
Territory (ACT) in 1993 is currently the only office
of its type in Australia. Under the Commissioner for
the Environment Act 1993, the Commissioner is
appointed by the Minister for a maximum of five
years.100 The functions of the Commissioner are, in
large part, to act as an environmental ombudsman
and as a commissioner of inquiry.101 The
Commissioner is also responsible for triennial ACT
State of the Environment (SOE) reports.102 Akin to a
performance audit, the SOE reports are to contain
an evaluation of the adequacy and effectiveness of
environmental
management,
including
an
assessment about the degree of ACT compliance
with national Environmental Protection measures
made by the National Environment Protection
Council.103
Agencies are to include in their annual reports
details of: any requests by the Commissioner for
assistance; any assistance provided in response; any
investigation carried out by the Commissioner in
respect of the agency; the Commissioner’s
recommendations made following an investigation;
and
the
agency’s
follow-up
to
those
recommendations.104 In addition, the Commissioner
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See NEPC Annual Report 1998-1999 at http://nepc.gov.au
The Oceans Policy 1998 is also notable for its call for
establishment of milestones for assessment and reporting on the
effectiveness of the policy (Pt 2, Ch 6.1), although their quality
and the robustness of the implementation assessment process
remains to be seen.
100
Article 5.
101
Under s12 Commissioner is to investigate complaints and
conduct investigations as directed by Minister.
102
Section 19.
103
Section 19(2)(b).
104
Section 23. The principal officer of an agency shall include in
the annual report of that agency:
(a) details of any request under s 18 received by the agency;
(b) details of any assistance provided in response to that request;
(c) details of any investigation carried out by the Commissioner
in respect of any activity of the agency; and
99
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may undertake a special report initiated by the
Commissioner or directed by the Minister. The
Commissioner’s annual report is to include
particulars of measures taken by the Territory to
implement any recommendation in an SOE report or
special
report
and
particulars
of
any
recommendation which the Commissioner believes
is still to be fully implemented.105
Thus, the broad mandate of the ACT
Commissioner for the Environment focuses on the
functions of Ombudsman, Commissioner of Inquiry
and that of manager of SOE reporting. These
include ACT public sector environmental
performance auditing, especially with respect to
NEPMs implementation and recommendations
flowing from the Commissioner’s past reports.
However, the substantial responsibilities of the
Office of the Commissioner on paper are belied by
its limited resources on the ground. It has the
equivalent of two full time staff. Therefore, its
activities are largely constrained to its function in
State of the Environment reporting.
Environmental auditing in the ACT also receives
attention in the ACT Auditor-General Act 1996. It is
unique in Australia in explicitly setting out the
mandate of the Audit-General to incorporate the
fourth “E”, for ecological sustainability, into the
conduct of ACT public sector performance audits.
Sustainability considerations are defined to include
the implementation of the precautionary principle;
inter-generational equity; conservation of biological
diversity and ecological integrity; and improved
valuation and pricing of environmental resources.106

(d) details of any recommendation made by the Commissioner
following an investigation of the activities of the agency; and
(e) details of any action the agency has taken in respect of each
recommendation.
105
Article 20(b) and (c).
106
Under s 12(1) of the Act, the Auditor General may at any
time conduct a performance audit in respect of a department,
Territory entity, joint venture or trust in which a Territory entity
has a controlling interest. Under s 12(1), in the conduct of the
performance audit, the Auditor General shall, where appropriate,
take into account environmental issues relative to the operations
being reviewed or examined, having regard to the principles of
ecologically sustainable development. Article 12(3) goes on to
define ecologically sustainable development as follows:
“(3) In this section ‘ecologically sustainable development’ means
the effective integration of economic and environmental
considerations in decision-making processes achievable through
implementation of the following principles:
(a) the precautionary principle, namely, that if there is a threat of
serious or irreversible environmental damage, a lack of full
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Despite the broad sweep of this requirement, the
Auditor-General’s performance audits are to include
sustainability considerations only “as appropriate”.
This has been interpreted such that it is not
appropriate to address the 4th “E” in all
circumstances, (rather than that all audits should
address the 4th “E” appropriately in each set of
circumstances). An issues scoping study at the
commencement of the audit process forms the basis
for the auditor’s exercise of judgement as to
appropriateness in each case.107
The ACT Office of the Auditor-General
comprises about 20 staff. Due to its limited
resources it has not initiated any specifically
environmental audits or undertaken assessment of
implementation of the 4th “E” since the entry into
force of the 1997 amending legislation.108 Thus, the
steps taken in the ACT are novel and exciting but
are less than they seem.

Other jurisdictions
An Office of the Commissioner for the
Environment was established in 1987 in Victoria,
within the Ministry for Planning and Environment,
to produce SOE reports. It issued two, assessing
Victoria’s inland waters (1988) and Victoria’s
agriculture and the environment (1991). However,
the Office and Commissioner positions were
abolished in 1991, during a restructuring of the
State’s institutions and a radical downsizing of its
government.109
A newly incumbent government is now acting to
establish a Commissioner for Ecologically
Sustainable Development.110 It has given its support

scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing
measures to prevent environmental degradation;
(b) the inter-generational equity principle, namely, that the
present generation should ensure that the health, diversity and
productivity of the environment is maintained or enhanced for
the benefit of future generations;
(c) conservation of biological diversity and ecological integrity;
(d) improved valuation and pricing of environmental resources.”
107
Personal interview, David Hughes, Office of AuditorGeneral, Australian Capital Territory, 20 September 2000.
108
Ibid.
109
31st Report to Parliament Interim Report of the Inquiry in
Environmental Accounting and Reporting; p 48. See
http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/paec (accessed 6 August
2000).
110
The role for a commissioner is being examined through the
Victorian Parliament Public Accounts and Estimates Committee,
to which the author gave evidence on 17 October 2000.
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to implementation of public sector environmental
reporting of public sector compliance with
legislation but has given no assurances concerning
compliance with its policy commitments.111 The
establishment of the Commissioner is currently
being considered through the Parliamentary Public
Accounts and Estimates Committee112 which has
produced an Interim Report (June 1999) and a
follow-up Issues Paper (June 2000) for public
consultation.113
Although State of Environment reporting occurs
on a triennial basis in New South Wales, an ad hoc
approach has been taken to environmental
performance auditing. For example, the NSW
Environment
Protection
Agency
oversees
implementation of the Government Waste
Reduction and Procurement Strategy (WRAP) and
Action for Air Policy, while the Sustainable Energy
Development
Authority
oversees
Energy
Management Policy targets. It is said that the Office
of Auditor-General is developing a more systematic
approach to government environmental performance
auditing.114
The foregoing survey of State and Territory
jurisdictions is not comprehensive. However, it does
indicate, that gradual movement towards improved
systemic
management
of
environmental
performance is taking place in some Australian
States and Territories.

International experiences compared
Canadian national model
Canada has adopted a model for environmental
auditing of governmental performance that looks
good on paper and also has resources on the ground.
The Auditor-General Act of Canada, as amended in

1995 requires that the Auditor-General report where
“money has been expended without due regard to
the
environmental
effects
of
those
expenditures.”115
Thus, the hurdle before officers of the AuditorGeneral is to acquire the necessary skills to ensure
that the 4th “E” is systematically incorporated into
all performance audits conducted by them. The
“materiality” of environmental concerns, that is,
scoping of the likely gravity of environmental
implications in a given audit, are to be assessed in
all cases. While this requires institutional
adjustment, the development of an auditing culture
which incorporates the 4th “E” has the full support
of the Auditor-General himself.116
The amended Auditor-General Act also requires
that the Auditor-General appoint a senior officer to
be called the Commissioner for the Environment
and
Sustainable
Development.117
The
Commissioner’s main task is sustainable
development monitoring and reporting on the
progress of major departments.118 The four main
areas of responsibility are to:
• monitor implementation of the institutional
sustainable development strategies which the
Act requires major departments and agencies to
prepare;
• produce audits and special studies on
environmental and sustainable development
issues;
• handle and record progress on citizen petitions
to the Commissioner regarding environmental
concerns;119 and
• report to the Canadian Parliament annually.120
The Auditor-General of Canada had previously
produced 42 performance audits relevant to
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environmental management.121 Three themes
identified in the Commissioner’s review of these 42
reports were (1) an implementation gap between the
government’s stated objectives and its actual
performance; (2) lack of coordination and
integration across departmental mandates and
political jurisdictions; and (3) inadequate
performance review and provision of information on
performance to Parliament. A work plan for the
Commissioner focused on improving information
and communications was designed to address these
themes.122
The Commissioner is located within the Office of
the Auditor-General and has a staff of
approximately 40 auditors and an annual budget of
C$3 million. Audit teams previously dealing with
Environment Canada and Natural Resources Canada
portfolios were folded into the Commissioner’s
staff, in addition to specialised recruits.123 A three
year forward cycle of audits and special studies
enables a systematic and strategic approach to the
task of national environmental performance
auditing. The broad formal mandate and the funding
of a Commissioner and staff to fulfil the
environmental performance auditing task has lifted
the profile of national sustainable development
auditing within Canada and seems to provide a
model for examination by comparable countries.
Particularly innovative are the institutional
sustainable development strategies required of
major departments and agencies. The strategies are
to set out the triennial environmental performance
goals each department selects for itself. Twenty
eight were tabled in Parliament in December 1997
and first reported on to Parliament by the
Commissioner in May 1998. The strategies were
assessed by the Commissioner in accordance with a
checklist of essentially procedural requirements. For
example, a strategy was required to be designed
following consultations with stakeholders, to set out
relevant issues, to relate those issues to goals, to
identify measurable goals, to indicate how the
strategy would change what the department does,
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Report of the Commissioner of the Environment and
Sustainable Development to the House of Representatives 1997,
p B-1.
122
Personal interview, Brian Emmett, Commissioner of the
Environment and Sustainable Development, Office of the
Auditor General, Canada, 18 January 1999.
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and how performance would be measured and
reported. Substantively, they were to deal with both
the agency’s policies and programs and with the
management of its internal operations. In this
context, Canada’s Guide to Green Government
1995, Directions for Greening Government
Operations 1995
and the Environmental
Management System (EMS) Self Assessment Guide
1994 were used to build a framework for reviewing
strategies.124 However, selection of the substantive
goals themselves remains a policy choice in which
the Commissioner has no role.125
The Commissioner’s May 1998 annual report
found two fundamental weaknesses (among other
problems) in the 1997 departmental strategies.
These were a lack of measurable targets and a
tendency to restate the status quo, rather than aim
towards future progress.126 In response to the
recommendations in the 1998 report, agencies
presented revised strategies to the Canadian
Parliament in March 1999. At the time of the
Commissioner’s May 1999 annual report, the
revised strategies had been in place for only three
months and the part of the report concerned with
them was partly about the consultative process
leading to their formulation. It found that there was
a high level of satisfaction among those consulted as
to their involvement but shortcomings were also
identified. These were due to limited feedback on
how participants’ views were reflected in strategies,
limited consultation and coordination among
departments in the formulation of strategies
affecting cross-sectoral matters, and limited
involvement of senior management in the
formulation process.127 The 2000 annual report
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Ch 1.
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Ch 1.30.
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Report of the Commissioner of the Environment and
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“Moving Up the Learning Curve – The Second Generation of
Sustainable Development Strategies” Exhibit 7. To ensure
engagement at senior levels it may be helpful to require that
CEOs of Departments personally present their organisation’s
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found that about 50 per cent of revised targets
included a clearly stated criterion for measuring
success and an expected completion date.128
Departments and agencies report to Parliament
on their own implementation of the their strategies
annually in October, based on progress to 31 March.
Implementation reports are based upon the
Canadian Treasury Board Guideline for the
Preparation of Departmental Performance Reports
to Parliament.129 The first departmental and agency
reports on their sustainable development strategies
as revised in 1999 were delivered in October 1999
and were addressed in the Commissioner’s May
2000 report. The report focused on whether
departments were doing what they said they would
in their strategies and whether they had the
capacities to implement their strategies.
It found that the quality of information supplied
fell well below requirements set out in the Treasury
Board Guideline, but that it is improving overall.
The Report assessed that about 20 per cent of the
strategies’ commitments were being met, as
compared to 11 per cent in 1999. In relation to
departments’ and agencies’ capacities to implement
their strategies, the report looked for the use of an
EMS and took ISO 14001 as the benchmark. It
found that half of the management practices
identified in the ISO 14001 standard were being
applied, as compared to a third in 1999. Capacity
tended to be stronger in the earlier stage of the
management cycle, concerning planning, and
became progressively weaker in the later stages, in
connection with checking corrective action and
policy review.130
In addition to implementation of sustainable
development strategies, the Commissioner’s annual
reports regularly address broader issues of wholeof-government
capacity
for
sustainable
development, such as inter- and intra-governmental
cooperation,
integration
of
environmental
considerations
into
policy decisions
and
environmentally sound internal operations. In 1998

the focus was on building of capacity in
management
techniques
for
sustainable
development, including expanding the horizons for
information input (for example, by inclusive
consultation), improving environmental impact
assessment information, adopting environmental
management systems, and developing indicators for
performance measurement131. In 1999, the focus
was on federal-provincial environment cooperation
agreements, organisational management systems
and decisions-making.132 In 2000, cooperative
partnerships within government, across government
and with the private sector were addressed.133
The reports also regularly address a selected
sectoral special study. Special studies have covered
climate change and biodiversity,134 toxic
substances135 and smog.136
Follow-up audits are conducted two years after
an initial audit is reported, to examine for resolution
of identified performance shortcomings. Following
up on four previous audits (hazardous waste, ozone
layer protection, biodiversity conservation, and
environmental assessment, 1998-1999), the
Commissioner’s 2000 report concluded that only
five per cent of audit recommendations had been
acted upon by government departments.137
Interviews conducted by the author with
Canadian officials indicated that officers of
Environment Canada felt that their department is
particularly challenged by the Commissioner. This
is to be expected as Environment Canada is seen as
the agency primarily responsible for the quality of
the federal environmental performance. It is the
department generating the most commitments and
with the most to lose through exposure of poor
implementation. Officials considered that the
Commissioner did not appreciate departmental
resource constraints, including its limited influence
over whole-of-government performance. This
concern has been picked up in the Commissioner’s
annual reports, in the chapters on capacity building.
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Despite the slow turn around time in response to
audit recommendations, it appears that the
Commissioner is making a difference in
governmental environmental performance. There
are apparent positive departmental responses to the
urging for adoption of EMS tools, such as
meaningful performance targets and indicators.
There is also, its seems for the first time anywhere,
frank assessment of governmental performance and
objective, authoritative critique of underperformance. The legal requirement that each
government department develop and adopt a
sustainable development strategy necessitates the
engagement of all government in environmental
management. Integrated management between the
different arms of government is promoted by
consultation with stakeholders. The legal
requirement that performance of each sustainable
development strategy be audited and a report tabled
in Parliament then ensures each department’s
accountability for fulfilling its responsibilities under
its strategy. These and other achievements foster
better environmental management, improved
implementation, and a culture of accountability.
Canada seems to be developing world’s best
practice in auditing of government environmental
performance.

New Zealand
The powers of the Office of Auditor-General in
New Zealand include environmental auditing. A
few environmental performance audits have been
produced,138 one of them jointly with the
Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment
in New Zealand (PCE).139 The PCE, which
commenced functioning in 1987, fulfils several
roles, being an environmental ombudsman, auditor
of aspects of government environmental
management, and an environmental policy adviser
to Parliament. Due to its novel nature, it is the
Office of the PCE which warrants particular
examination.
Helen Hughes, a past Commissioner (1987-1996)
has defined the purpose of the Office as being to
provide “an independent check on the capability of

138

For example, Regional Councils – Maintaining River
Protection Works (1998); Administration of the Resource
Management Act 1991 by Regional Councils (1996)
(http://www.netlink.co.nz/~oag/Reports 6 September 1999).
139
That is, Marine Fisheries Management (1990).
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the New Zealand system of environmental
management and the performance of public
authorities in maintaining and improving the quality
of the environment”.140 The PCE audit function is
set out in s 16(f) of the Environment Act 1986 and
the major audit function originally expected of it
concerned environmental impact assessments, as
this was the role of the previous Commission for the
Environment. However, the onerous responsibility
for oversight of assessments shifted, first to the
newly created Ministry of Environment under the
Environment Act 1986 and then to local and
regional authorities
under the Resources
Management Act 1991. Therefore, the role of the
PCE as auditor of assessments withered after a
transitional period. The PCE’s strategy in reviewing
environmental assessments has been, instead, to
establish independent review panels for particular
assessments.
Audits have addressed the overall environmental
performance of two regional public authorities and a
review has been conducted of the management of
local and regional councils of their assessment
responsibilities. However, fulfilment of the audit
role of the PCE has been very limited. This seems
due to the varied functions and limited capacity of
the Office of PCE (which numbers 12 persons) and,
to an extent, its overlap with the audit role of the
New Zealand Auditor-General.
The fluidity of the roles played by the PCE has
allowed it also to conduct “reviews” acting as
environmental policy adviser to Parliament, or
“guardian of New Zealand’s system of
environmental management”. These reviews of the
existing system of policies are intended to identify
gaps or shortcomings and are comparable to
environmental audits in the sense of its management
system audits described above.141 However, they do
not amount to a process for systematic approach to
review
of
governmental
environmental
performance. It would seem that the Canadian
model better serves that role.
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PCE Annual Report 1993-4 (Wellington 1994) p 4.10, cited
in Tom Buhrs, “Barking Up Which Trees? New Zealand’s
Environmental Watchdog” in G Hawke, (ed) Guardians for the
Environment (Institute of Policy Studies, Wellington 1997), p
193.
141
For example, it performed reviews concerning marine
fisheries management, dry tussock grasslands, sustainable energy
management and rabbit and possum pest management.
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Future of Australian Commonwealth
environmental auditing
What lies in the future for implementation
reviews of Commonwealth sustainable development
policy? Auditing of its performance is obstructed by
the lack of specific or quantified performance
commitments against which policy implementation
can be measured, and a lack of baseline data to
relate meaningful performance commitments to.
Concerning the need for improvement of
information on baselines that specific performance
commitments can be related to, the Productivity
Commission and ANAO reports lay a great deal of
hope at the door of the National Land and Water
Resources Audit. National SOE reporting could also
be useful here in providing better baseline
information. Important steps to improve baseline
information coherency are also being taken through
the National Pollutant Inventory142 and at State and
Territory levels, through the uptake of regular state
of the environment reporting.
While these will not gather the broader context
of socio-economic data relevant to sustainable
development, those data sets are addressed in part
by the “sustainability indicators” being developed
by the Australian Bureau of Statistics in association
with the Australian and New Zealand Environment
and Conservation Council (ANZECC).143 There is
reason for modest confidence that those combined
efforts could support development of a coherent
national
information
set
concerning
the
development of scientifically sound national
baselines and indicators.
In contrast, concerning specific or quantified
Commonwealth
government
performance
commitments in the field of sustainable
development, there is still no significant movement
forward (for either policy formulation and
implementation, or internal resources inputs and
outputs). Nevertheless, the strengthening of
baselines and indicators, advocacy of private sector
models of management and accountability and
trends displayed in the AFMA and NEPM
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See the NEPC website at http://www.nepc.gov.au (accessed
19 October 2000).
143
See “National Headline Sustainability Indicators” on the
themes/environment database of the Australian Bureau of
Statistics at http//:www.abs.gov.au (accessed 24 September
2000).

effectiveness reporting process, may provide some
ground for optimism as to future improvement in
the quality of Commonwealth environmental
performance commitments. It is likely that regular
performance reporting will generate feedback for
improved benchmarking of commitments.
In relation to the development of Commonwealth
agency internal environmental management
systems, s 516A of the Environment Protection and
Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 is timely. In
requiring agency environmental reporting, it
provides an opportunity to introduce systematic
audit of agency environmental performance. But the
Australian community would have been better
served if the legislation had articulated clearer
performance objectives to report against, explicitly
requiring the formulation of agency targets.
Currently, these need to be implied by working
backward from the consequences of the reporting
obligation. Only by implication of the requirement
that agencies continuously improve their
environmental management144 is there a requirement
upon them to develop an environmental
management system. No doubt this will become
apparent after initial audits under s 516A are
conducted.

Australian
Commissioner
Environment

for

the

Assuming that arguments gathered in this article
persuade that there is a need for robust review of
Commonwealth environmental performance, what
institutional mechanism should be used to perform
that review?
The most tested and reliable mechanism is
environmental audit, as performed by an
independent authority. This could see the
establishment of a specific ANAO mandate, such as
an Office of the Environmental Auditor or a special
Commissioner for ESD, along the lines of the
Canadian model. The advantages of a special
Auditor or Commissioner are that he or she would
lift the profile and importance of Commonwealth
environmental performance audit. In its dissenting
recommendations in the Senate Report on the
Environment
Protection
and
Biodiversity
Conservation Bill 1999, the Australian Labour Party
called for the ANAO to perform environment audit

144

See s 516A(6)(e).
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functions.145
If
located
outside
the
ANAO,
the
Auditor/Commissioner would be more vulnerable to
budget cuts and political hostility than if located
within the Auditor-General’s office, which is an
institution with 100 years of respectable assurance
of governmental responsibility and accountability.
Within
the
Auditor-General’s
office
the
Auditor/Commissioner also would have access to
resources and expertise. In addition, location within
the Auditor-General’s would promote the
incorporation of the 4th “E” into the mainstream
work of the ANAO.
Had the EPBC Act also required the systematic
conduct of agency performance audits this would
have been helpful to ensure that agency reports are
accurate and meaningful. In place of the current
footnote to s 516A stating that agency
environmental reports could be audited, among
other consequential amendments following the Act,
the Auditor-General Act 1997 could have enhanced
the Auditor-General’s environmental performance
audit function. Although the Australian AuditorGeneral currently has implicit powers to conduct
environmental audits, there is no specific mandate.
The International Organisation of Supreme Audit
Institutions (INTOSAI) Working Group on
Environmental Auditing surveys has found that
national audit institutions with an explicit
environmental
audit
mandate
complete
proportionally more environmental audits and tend
to be better resourced for the task.146 The ANAO
currently has few resources with which to introduce
a coherent program of environmental audits and
may need to refine its expertise and
methodologies.147
On the other hand, location within the ANAO
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See Appendix II below. The Australian Labour Party has
since made the creation of the office of Commissioner for the
Environment part of its policy platform. See Sydney Morning
Herald, 17 April 2000.
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INTOSAI Working Group on Environmental Auditing
“Results of 1993 Survey” at http://www.rekenkamer.nl/ea
(accessed 21 September 2000).
147
For example, auditors would need to be familiar with the
environmental context, including baseline conditions, database
use, and sustainable development concerns. A systematic cycle of
audits would be needed, preferably based upon the gravity of the
risk being managed. INTOSAI also found that SAIs that
conducted follow-up audits estimated the influence of their
reports more favourably than those that did not follow-up.
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would limit the range of other environmental review
tasks a Commissioner for ESD could appropriately
undertake. The title of Commissioner is ambiguous
and the job description can be broadly conceived. In
addition to audit of environmental performance, the
environmental review tasks which some might wish
a Commissioner to undertake for government could
include:
• environmental ombudsman;
• commissioner of public inquiry;
• independent adviser on ESD policy; and
• coordinator of state of environment reporting.
These are not audit functions and would not be
successfully located within the ANAO’s current
mandate and structure.
Calls by the Australian Democrats, Australian
Greens and The Greens (WA) for the establishment
of a Commissioner for the Environment are set out
in their dissenting recommendations in the Senate
report into the Environment Protection and
Biodiversity Conservation Bill 1999.148 The
Commissioner’s central function in each proposal
appears to be environmental performance auditing.
In its dissenting recommendation the Australian
Labour Party called for the Auditor-General to
undertake this task. Since then the proposal of the
Australian Labour Party for a Commissioner for the
Environment has been set out in its 2000
environmental policy platform.149 The proposal is
broad and hints at possibilities of multiple roles,
including auditor, ombudsman, SOE reporter and
government adviser. This policy would be likely to
see the creation of a Commissioner responsible for a
range of functions and located outside the ANAO.
Related environmental review roles should be
carried by bodies most suited to the appropriate
function. The combining of diverse functions into
one new institution outside the authority of the
Auditor-General is likely to see the new institution’s
environmental audit function minimised, as was
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See Appendix II.
Chapter 31.8 of the ALP 2000 Policy Platform states that
“Labor supports the establishment of a Commissioner for the
Environment to provide objective, independent analysis and
recommendations on environment and sustainable development;
monitor and report on progress towards sustainable development;
consider public complaints; and assist the Auditor General on
matters related to environment and sustainable development
issues”. See:
http://www.alp.org.au/policy/platform2000/chapter_13.html#gree
ning (accessed 26 October 2000).
149
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apparent in the ACT and New Zealand cases. Also
likely would be conflicts between various
environmental review roles within the one
institution. For example, could a commissioner
independently act as ombudsman in relation to
outcomes from recommendations made by the
Commissioner, or audit his/her own performance as
ombudsman? Given too many roles is it probable
that the proposed Commissioner would perform
poorly overall and that some roles will atrophy.
Therefore, an environmental ombudsman is most
appropriately located within a properly resourced
Federal
ombudsman’s
office.150
Public
environmental performance auditing should be
conducted through the Office of the AuditorGeneral. Independent advice on ESD policy should
come from an appropriately constituted Council on
ESD, which is a non-governmental stakeholder
representatives group.151 SOE reporting should be
coordinated by independent experts, sitting on a
steering committee with a statutory mandate.
Synergies between these bodies could be promoted
through structural linkages. For example, due to the
major implications of SOE reporting for longer term
ESD policy, the SOE steering committee could be
chaired by the head of the ESD Council. It should
also include a representative of the Environmental
Auditor/Commissioner.152 Each of these bodies
would be established more securely if they were
given statutory authority.153

Conclusions
There is much legislation and policy in Australia
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The Commonwealth Ombudsman can presently address
environmental complaints but has no specific environmental
mandate and has few resources to share around. For general
information see: www.comb.gov.au
151
National councils on ESD have been established in over 150
countries (Productivity Commission Inquiry Report No 5, 25
May 1999, p 58.
152
For the 1996 SOE national report, a 16 member SOE
Advisory Council was formed, chaired by an independent expert.
The Council included two government ex-officio members. See
Commonwealth of Australia State of the Environment Australia
1996 “The Reporting Process”(CSIRO, Melbourne 1996), pp x
and 1.9.
153
Public inquiries would be the exception, as these could be
managed on an ad hoc basis in consultation with the
Commissioner for the Environment and the ESD Council. The
Environment Protection and Biodiversity Act 1999, s 516B
establishes, for the first time, a legislative basis for SOE
reporting.

articulating the
objectives of sustainable
development. However, two comprehensive reports,
by the OECD and the Productivity Commission,
have identified the need to establish policy
implementation review mechanisms at the national
level to systematically assess progress towards
achievement of ESD objectives. Other than within
the fisheries and overseas aid sectors, no
Commonwealth management mechanisms were in
place until the enactment of s 516A of the EPBC
Act. The Act’s provisions are tentative and weak,
leaving much for administrative clarification.
The ANAO has a mandate to conduct audits of
environmental performance. However, institutional
obstacles at the national level to the use of
performance auditing as the process for this review
mechanism are described in ANAO reports, and are
indicated in the Productivity Commission and
OECD reports. They are lack of baseline data and
lack of specific or quantified performance
commitments against which policy implementation
can be measured. In addition, there is no systematic
approach to environmental performance auditing.
Steps are being taken to gradually improve the
data sets on which all performance measurement
relies. However, Commonwealth performance
commitments remain elusively vague and its
agencies are not yet required to develop institutional
targets. The AFMA experience suggests that, in a
conducive statutory and operational context,154
external environmental audit can assist reorientation
of management systems to improve agency
performance. Thus a program of environmental
audit might assist the development of specific
performance
targets
within
institutional
management systems.
The ANAO is the appropriate home for a
comprehensive program of environmental audits. It
currently lacks adequate resources or a recognised
mandate for that task. Establishing an Office of the
Environmental Auditor, or a Commissioner for the
Environment within the ANAO would be the most
effective way to allocate the resources and establish
the mandate for a Commonwealth environmental
audit program. This would be a statutory position

154
That is, under AFMA’s constitutive legislation, ESD is one of
the organisation’s core objectives and the health status of the fish
stocks it manages is readily measurable.
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created under the Auditor-General Act 1997.
Various other forms of environmental policy
review would be better assigned to more appropriate
bodies, such as a Federal Environmental
Ombudsman, a national Council for ESD and a
steering committee for ESD reporting. These forms
of environmental review are extremely important
and are inter-related. For example, it should be
obvious that much, including performance auditing,
relies upon adequate baseline data gathered through
SOE reporting. The focus of this article on
performance auditing is not intended to detract from
them. It reflects only that environmental
performance auditing has received attention in
current public debate, that independent reviews of
Australian implementation of ESD imply that it is
much needed here, and that it is successfully being
taken up in a similar federal setting in Canada.
The urgent need for Australian Federal
governmental accountability for environmental
performance is a clear priority. Environmental
auditing by an independent body would provide the
system and machinery necessary. All that is needed
is political desire for good governance.
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Appendix I
Environmentally Relevant Performance Audits:
Australian National Audit Office, 1990–1991 to
1999-2000 (provided to the author by ANAO, 27
June 2000)
1999-2000
• Commonwealth
Electricity
Procurement,
Report No 25 1999-2000 (Australian
Greenhouse Office, Commonwealth Scientific
and
Industrial
Research
Organisation,
Department of Defence, and Department of
Finance and Administration);
• Weather Services in the Bureau of
Meteorology, Report No 22 1999-2000
(Department of the Environment and Heritage);
and
• Managing Pest and Disease Emergencies,
Report No 9 1999-2000 (Agriculture, Fisheries
and Forestry – Australia).
• 1998-99
• Operations of Green Corps, Report No 42
1998-99 (Department of Education, Training
and Youth Affairs).
• 1997-98
• Preliminary Inquiries into the Natural Heritage
Trust, Report No 42 1997-98 (Department of
Environment);
• Strategic and Operational Management of the
National
Registration
Authority
for
Agricultural and Veterinary Chemicals, Report
No 26 1997-98;
• Commonwealth Management of the Great
Barrier Reef, Report No. 33 1997-98 (Great
Barrier Marine Park Authority); and
• Sydney Airport – Noise Amelioration Program,
Report No 17 1997-98 (Department of
Transport and Regional Development).
• 1996-97
• Commonwealth Natural Resource Management
and Environment Programs: Australia’s Land,
Water and Vegetation Resources, Report No.
36 1996-97;
• Maralinga Rehabilitation Project Tendering and
Commercial Arrangements, Report No 18
1996-97 (Department of Primary Industries and
Energy);
• Energy Management of Commonwealth
Buildings, Report No. 10 1996-97 (Department
of Primary Industries and Energy, Department
of Administrative Services); and

•

•
•

•
•

•

•
•

•

•
•

•

•
•
•

•

•
•

Building Better Cities, Report No 9 1996-97
(Department of Transport and Regional
Development).
1995-96
Environmental Management of Commonwealth
Land: Site Contamination and Pollution
Prevention, Report No 31 1995-96.
1994-95
Energy Management in Defence, ANZAC Ship
Project Contract Amendments, Overseas Visits
by Defence Officers, National Landcare
Program, Report No 29 1994-95; and
Is Australia ready to respond to a major oil
spill?, Report No 9 1994-95 (Australian
Maritime Safety Authority).
1993-94
Rural Research and Development Program,
Report No 38 1993-94 (Department of Primary
Industries and Energy); and
Implementation of a New Program: Landcare
and Environment Action Program (LEAP),
Report No 34 1993-94 (Department of
Employment, Education and Training).
1992-93
Implementation of an Interim Greenhouse
Response: Energy Management Programs,
Report No 32 1992-93 (Department of Primary
Industries and Energy); and
Living with our Decisions: Commonwealth
Environmental Impact Assessment Processes,
Report No 10 1992-93.
1991-92
Energy Management of Commonwealth
Buildings, Report No 47 1991-92;
Australian Quarantine Inspection Service –
Quarantine Division, Report No 35 1991-92
(Department of Primary Industries and Energy);
and
Program Evaluation in the Departments of
Social Security and Primary Industries and
Energy, Report No 26 1991-92 (Department of
Social Security, Department of Primary
Industries and Energy).
1990-91
Antarctic Supply Vessel – Chartering
Arrangements, Report No 9 1990-91
(Department of the Arts, Sport, the
Environment, Tourism and Territories).
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Appendix II
Senate
Environment,
Communications,
Information Technology and the Arts Committee:
Legislation Committee - Report on Environment
Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Bill 1998
& Environmental Reform Consequential Provisions)
Bill 1998 (27 April 1999), Chapter 5: General and
Preliminary Matters
Commissioner for the Environment
5.14 A constituency for the creation of a
commissioner for the environment was evident
throughout the hearings of the Committee. [8] The
concept derives from both overseas precedents in
Canada and New Zealand and Australian precedents
in the Australian Capital Territory and Victoria. [9]
The suggestion was made that an office of
Commissioner for the environment should be
established.
5.15 The various submissions suggest a range of
possible roles for the proposed environmental
commissioner. Principally, it appeared that the role
of an environmental commissioner would consist of
independent review of government environmental
agencies and performance, including review of
bilateral agreements, auditing of compliance with
approvals and agreements made under the Bill and
establishing whether the Commonwealth has met
sustainable development strategies. [10] It could
include the development of sustainable development
strategies and assessment of whether the
Commonwealth had met its obligations under such
strategies. [11] In addition, the commissioner could
be involved in the creation or coordination of
periodic State of the Environment reports. [12]
5.16 Mr Beale* did not consider that a
Commissioner of the Environment would be an
appropriate mechanism under the Bill:
“It is a very bureaucratic approach. We have not
seen the necessity to build such a role into the
Bill. The Minister – and, serving the Minister,
the Department – will, of course, have an
obligation to monitor and evaluate, for example,
State compliance with bilateral agreements. … I
am going to have to report to the Parliament on

* Roger Beale, Permanent Secretary, Environment Australia
(ed note)
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that every year and no doubt be examined in
relation to it. But it is not a case of setting up a
separate bureaucratic arm for that. [13]”
5.17 The Committee does not consider that it
would be appropriate to establish a commissioner
for the environment under this Bill. The Bill
contains
adequate
safeguards
to
ensure
accountability for the operation of bilateral
agreements and of the Act, including review and
reporting mechanisms. The Secretary is under an
obligation to report to Parliament annually on the
operation of the Bill and the report must be laid
before both Houses of the Parliament. [14] The
Auditor General will be able to conduct audits on
matters related the implementation of the Bill under
the Auditor General Act 1997.
5.18 The Committee considers further that the
suggested functions of the proposed environmental
commissioner extend well beyond the scope of the
Bill. For example, the development of sustainable
development strategies by Commonwealth agencies
and the coordination of State of the Environment
reporting are much broader concepts than the Bill’s
focus on environmental assessment and approvals
and biodiversity conservation. The Committee
considers that the underlying assumption that there
needs to be a legislative basis for such processes as
State of the Environment reporting is also
questionable, as the current administrative basis for
this is very successful. [15]
5.19 The Committee does not consider this Bill
to be the appropriate vehicle for the creation of what
is essentially an independent statutory review body.
To be effective, such a position would need its own
legislative basis.
Labour Senators’ Findings
Labour Senators are of the view that there is a
need to ...
12. Provide for the Auditor General to fulfil
environmental audit functions.
Minority Report by the Australian Democrats
Recommendation : That a Commissioner for the
Environment be established as an independent
authority to carry out functions such as reviewing
bilateral agreements, monitoring State compliance
with bilateral agreements and reviewing the
performance of Commonwealth Departments and
agencies in implementing their ESD strategies.
Report by the Australian Greens and The
Greens (WA)
Recommendation : A Commissioner for the
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Environment should be established as an
independent authority to review the performance of
the Commonwealth in fulfilling its environmental
objectives and priorities. For example it would
review the performance of Commonwealth
departments and agencies in implementing their
ESD strategies.
Notes:
[8] For example, Mr Gregory Rose, National
Environmental Law Association, Proof Committee
Hansard, Canberra, 4 March 1999, p 115; Mr Simon
Molesworth, Environment Institute of Australia,
Proof Committee Hansard, Melbourne, 18 March
1999, p 302; Mr Michael Krockenberger, Australian
Conservation Foundation, Proof Committee
Hansard, Melbourne, 18 March 1999, p 281;
Environmental Defender’s Office, Submission 15,
pp 47-48.
[9] Mr Simon Molesworth, Environment
Institute of Australia, Proof Committee Hansard,
Melbourne, 18 March 1999, p 302; Environment
Institute of Australia, Submission 623, p 5ff; Mr
Gregory Rose, National Environmental Law
Association, Proof Committee Hansard, Canberra, 4
March 1999, p 115.
[10] Mr Simon Molesworth, Environment
Institute of Australia, Proof Committee Hansard,
Melbourne, 18 March 1999, p 302; Environmental
Defender’s Office, Submission 15, p 47; Mr
Michael Krockenberger, Australian Conservation
Foundation, Proof Committee Hansard, Melbourne,
18 March 1999, p 281.
[11] Mr Gregory Rose, National Environmental
Law Association, Proof Committee Hansard,
Canberra, 4 March 1999, p 115; Environmental
Defender’s Office, Submission 15, p 47.
[12] Mr Michael Krockenberger, Australian
Conservation Foundation, Proof Committee
Hansard, Melbourne 18 March 1999, p 281;
Environmental Defender’s Office, Submission 15, p
48; Mr Gregory Rose, National Environmental Law
Association, Proof Committee Hansard, Canberra, 4
March 1999, p 115; Environment Institute of
Australia, Submission 623, p 3.
[13] Proof Committee Hansard, Canberra, 4
March 1999, p 175.
[14] Clause 516.
[15] The 1996 State of the Environment Report
was produced by seven expert reference groups
working under the broad discretion of the State of
the Environment Advisory Council.

Appendix III
Inventory of Selected Commonwealth Policies
on the Environment, categorised by sector.
• Ecologically Sustainable Development
• National Strategy for Ecologically Sustainable
Development
• Local Agenda 21
• Marine and Coastal
• Australia’s Oceans Policy
• Coastal and Marine Planning Program
• Coasts and Clean Seas Program
• Urban Stormwater Initiative
• National Action Program to Combat Pollution
of the Sea by Oil and other Noxious and
Hazardous Substances
• Marine Species Protection Program,
• Fisheries Action Program
• Forests
• Ecologically Sustainable Forest Management
Program
• Regional Forests Agreements
• 2020 Vision
• National Forest Policy Statement
• Land, Soil and Freshwater
• Bushcare
• Landcare
• National Rivercare Initiative
• National Wetlands Program
• Wetlands Policy of the Commonwealth
Government of Australia
• Murray-Darling 2000
• National Principles and Guidelines for
Rangelands Management (under development)
• National Water Conservation Strategy (under
development)
• Natural Heritag e Trust
• Biodiversity
• National Strategy for the Conservation of
Australia’s Biological Diversity
• National Strategy for the Conservation of
Australian
Species
and
Communities
Threatened with Extinction
• Atmosphere
• Ozone Protection strategy
• National Greenhouse Strategy
• Greenhouse 21C
• Greenhouse Challenge

